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Social capital in the international operations of family SMEs 
Tanja Kontinen and Arto Ojala 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The aim of this study is to discuss how social capital is developed in the 
internationalization process of small and medium-sized family enterprises (family 
SMEs).  
 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper reports findings from an in-depth multiple 
case study with four Finnish manufacturing family SMEs. The data were analyzed 
through the perspectives of (i) structural holes, (ii) network closure, and (iii) the 
interplay between these two mechanisms.  
 
Findings – Our material demonstrated that family entrepreneurs had a large number of 
structural holes when launching international operations, but also after several years of 
running international operations. Instead of trying to span structural holes, they 
concentrated merely on developing the network closure with agents and subsidiary staff. 
The case firms spent a lot of resources on finding suitable network ties and on 
developing good network closure with the selected social capital ties.  
 
Research limitations/implications – There are some aspects that might differ depending 
on the home and target country of firms. For instance, firms in some Asian countries are 
able to utilize emigrant relationships that help them with networking, which was not 
the case here with Finnish family SMEs. 
 
Practical implications – Family entrepreneurs seem to have a tendency to concentrate 
on a limited number of foreign partners, and to neglect the building of new 
relationships that could help them in future challenges.  
Originality/value – In this study, we (i) respond to calls for more research on network 
development in the entrepreneurial process, especially in the context of 
internationalization, (ii) we introduce the notions of network closure and structural 
holes to the internationalization context, and (iii) we reveal how social capital restricts 
and facilitates family SMEs’ international operations.  
Keywords family SMEs; social capital; network closure; structural holes; foreign 
operations 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social capital has attracted the interest of researchers in various research fields for 
several decades (e.g. Adler and Kwon, 2002). Social capital is essentially dynamic, being 
dependent on network development: the capital can increase or decrease as firms 
deepen existing relationships, establish new ones, and end problematic ones (Jack et al., 
2008; Larson and Starr, 1993; Rauch, 2001). An understanding of this kind of network 
development is clearly important for research on entrepreneurship (Hoang and 
Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Jack et al., 2008) since changes in the network will affect the 
further development of the firm (Coviello, 2006; Jack, 2005), including any 
internationalization processes that are undertaken (Chetty and Agndal, 2007). However, 
much remains to be discovered about networks and their development in the 
entrepreneurial process, (Jack, 2010), and there have been calls for qualitative research to 
increase understanding of the phenomenon (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010).  
          Especially among SMEs, network ties between employees are tightly integrated, 
and changes in the network structure have more effect than in large multinationals. 
Family SMEs are highly suitable for research on social capital; indeed, social capital has 
been proposed as a particular feature of family-owned businesses, on account of the 
close ties between family members (Salvato and Melin, 2008). Nevertheless, although 
close ties between family members and employees create social capital, it has been 
argued that such ties may restrict access to new and valuable information outside the 
firm (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973).  
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          In the international context, we have very limited knowledge of how family firms 
develop their network ties outside the firm during the internationalization process 
(Kontinen and Ojala, 2010). For these reasons, the broad aim of this study is to determine 
how family SMEs develop their social capital during the progress of international operations, and 
to examine how, within this course of events, two posited mechanisms, namely (i) network 
closure, and (ii) structural holes, interact with each other. These mechanisms will be 
discussed in Section 2 below, which will be followed (Section 3) by a statement of our 
more specific research questions. 
 
2. Concepts and definitions 
 
2.1 Social capital 
 
Social capital differs from other types of capital (such as financial, physical, or human 
capital), since it is a form of capital that is not located within a certain place, being rather 
embedded in relationships between actors in a social network (Adler and Kwon, 2002; 
Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). In the study reported here, we use the 
definition by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 243): social capital is “the sum of the actual 
and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit.” The dynamic nature 
of social capital indicates that it may increase or decrease as firms deepen existing 
relationships, establish new ones, and end problematic ones (Larson and Starr, 1993; 
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Rauch, 2001). It should be noted that social capital may not be advantageous in every 
case. For instance, a close network can limit the group’s access to new information and 
new ways of doing things; or social capital partners may prove untrustworthy, leading 
to a reduced performance for the firm (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Nevertheless, 
having only limited social capital is usually detrimental: the less social capital a firm has, 
the more it is exposed to opportunistic behavior, and the more difficult it may be to 
build long-term relationships (Walker et al., 1997).  
           
2.2 Structural holes and network closure 
 
The two most important network mechanisms providing social capital are structural 
holes and network closure (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988). The traditional view of social 
capital emphasizes the positive effects of network closure, i.e. cohesive ties, in terms of 
social network benefits (Coleman, 1988). However, according to structural hole theory 
(Burt, 1992), social capital stems from the possibilities permitted by separate ties, i.e. by 
a lack of network closure. On the face of it, these theories represent opposing views on 
how networks create social capital. 
          According to the structural holes theory (Burt, 1992), the benefits of social capital 
result from the diversity of information and the brokerage opportunities created by the 
lack of connections between separate groups in social networks. Structural holes (gaps, 
lacunae in networks) permit a competitive advantage for a person (or firm) whose 
relationships span the holes. Individuals whose networks have only a limited number of 
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structural holes know and have control over more rewarding opportunities. Based on 
this, a structural hole is here defined in the words used by Burt (2005, p. 25) as “a place 
in a network that could create value. A structural hole exists between two people or 
groups when either party is unaware of the value available if they were to coordinate on 
some point.” Relationships acting as bridges to other groups, such as firms, can result 
from events such as the setting up of cross-functional teams, inter-organizational 
conventions, or professional meetings bringing together people from different groups 
(Burt, 2000). Network brokerage can also be indirect, if there is a strong connection to a 
person/firm with a strong connection to someone else who is important for the firm 
(Burt, 2010). This can be the case, for instance, if the foreign agent of the firm has strong 
relationships with customers whom the headquarters staff do not know at all. 
Network closure is created by a network of strongly interconnected persons (Burt, 
2000). It emphasizes the positive effect of cohesive social ties in the creation of social 
capital. Hence, network closure refers to networks in which everyone is connected in 
such a way that no one can escape the notice of others, which in operational terms usually 
means a dense network (Coleman, 1988). Social norms are given “closure” when two or 
more individuals recognize that it is advantageous for their interests to cooperate. In a 
closed network “people have strong relations with one another or can reach one another 
indirectly through strong relations to mutual contacts” (Burt, 2010, p. 251). In the first 
place, closure facilitates access to information, because another person in the network 
can briefly convey what is essential, and knowledge sharing is efficient. Secondly, 
network closure facilitates sanctions, and this has the effect of enhancing the level of 
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trust in the network. When people have strong relations in their network, they get more 
reliable communication channels; furthermore, they are protected, because by means of 
their contacts they are better able to cooperate against someone who does not obey the 
network’s norms (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988).  
          These two network mechanisms refer to a different means of creating social capital. 
Yet although they have been regarded as opposed to each other, they have also been 
seen as complementary mechanisms (Burt, 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Podolny 
and Baron, 1997). Burt (2000) found that the performance of a firm is the highest when 
the firm achieves high levels in both network closure and the number of non-redundant 
contacts beyond the firm. Networks that span structural holes may provide the manager 
with timely information about new opportunities, whereas cohesive ties are needed to 
exploit those opportunities (Podolny and Baron, 1997). According to Burt (2010, p. 151), 
“[w]here brokerage is about vision and growth from expanded horizons, closure is 
about control and productivity associated with people aligned on a shared goal.”  
According to Gargiulo and Benassi (2000), these two mechanisms cannot be 
maximized simultaneously, since the trade-off between safety (i.e. network closure) and 
flexibility (i.e. structural holes) is inherent to the dynamics of social networks. In the 
context of the formation of inter-organizational ties, organizations prefer to form 
embedded ties1 (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), which may lead to network closure. In a later 
phase, when organizational change is needed, the flexibility offered by structural holes 
may be more important than network closure. 
                                                 
1Embedded here refers that the ties are an integral part of a surrounding whole. 
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2.3 Social capital and internationalization in family firms 
 
Important factors related to social capital and internationalization in family firms are, 
for instance, their: (i) unusual devotion to continuity, (ii) tendency to nurture the 
community of employees very carefully, and (iii) search for closer connections with 
customers and partners in order to sustain the business (Miller et al., 2008). These factors 
are related to both the internal/familial and the external social capital of family firms. 
Internal capital is based on strong internal relationships and interactions composed of 
the aspirations and capabilities of family members (Salvato and Melin, 2008), which can 
be assumed to have an effect on the manner in which family firms build and develop 
external social capital. Strong internal social capital can reduce transaction costs, and it 
can facilitate information flows, knowledge creation and accumulation, and creativity 
(Arregle et al., 2007; Burt, 2000). However, internal networks do not result in faster 
internationalization; in fact they may become a liability by hindering the flow of 
information and blocking links to new contacts (Musteen et al., 2010).  
External social capital connects family firms to diverse networks. It is the result of 
family firms’ interactions, communications and relationships with diverse external 
stakeholders, and it makes it possible to obtain resources from other companies (Arregle 
et al., 2007). Networks of this kind are needed if the firm is to innovate and succeed. 
Family firms have been shown to have a limited number of external network ties in 
comparison to non-family firms (Graves and Thomas, 2004). This can be seen as a 
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consequence of their strong internal social capital (Arregle et al., 2007; Salvato and Melin, 
2008). However, external social capital ties prevent family firms from becoming too 
conservative and unable to adapt to environmental changes (Miller et al., 2008).  
As regards internationalization, family involvement in management has been 
seen as factor tending towards caution in the internationalization processes of family 
firms (Claver et al., 2008). There is evidence that family firms are less likely to 
internationalize than non-family firms (Graves and Thomas, 2006). If family firms 
internationalize, they do it mainly incrementally, proceeding step by step (Graves and 
Thomas, 2008). In addition to a lack of external network ties, the reasons for the cautious 
and incremental internationalization might be, for instance, their limited growth 
objectives, avoidance of risk, restricted financial capital, and limited managerial 
capabilities (see Kontinen and Ojala (2010) for further review).  
 
3. Aims, critique and research questions 
 
In this paper we aim to contribute to research on social capital and firm 
internationalization by modifying network closure and structural holes perspectives in 
ways appropriate to the context of firm internationalization. Although the literature 
review here clearly demonstrates the important role of social capital, in general, and 
especially in the context of family firms, we do not know much how the two network 
mechanisms, i.e. structural holes and network closure, explain (separately and together) 
the internationalization of family firms (see also Kontinen and Ojala, 2010). This is 
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important especially for family SMEs in which relationships between employees are 
commonly close and highly integrated. The broad issue addressed in this study can be 
phrased as follows:  How do network closure and structural holes explain the development of 
international operations among family SMEs? This can be addressed via three specific 
research questions which we shall focus on in our observations: 1. How do the 
international operations of family SMEs develop in terms of structural holes? 2. How does 
network closure develop in the international operations of family SMEs? 3. How do family SMEs 
bridge structural holes and develop network closure in their international operations? 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Since the objectives of this research were more related to understanding than to 
measuring (Jack, 2005), and since current understanding of the dynamics of bridging 
social capital in the context of family SMEs is limited, a qualitative research method was 
regarded as most appropriate for this study. Social capital is “an aggregate concept that 
has its basis in individual behavior, attitudes, and predispositions” (Brehm and Rahn, 
1997, p. 1000) – an aspect which further strengthens the need for a qualitative study, 
since the focus is on studying the processes, contents and dynamics of networks 
consisting of individuals (Coviello, 2006; Jack, 2005, 2010; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 
2010).           
For this study, we selected a multiple-case study with four family SMEs 
operating in the French market. Finland was chosen as the country of origin because it 
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has a small and open economy with a very limited domestic market (OECD, 1997) 
wehre the internationalization is an important growth strategy. The choice of the French 
market as the context made it possible to investigate the dynamics of social capital in a 
particular context, one that would be similar for all the firms involved in the study.  
          As far as the definition of a family firm is concerned, it can be defined as one in 
which the family (i) controls the largest block of shares or votes, (ii) has one or more of 
its members in key management positions, and (iii) has members of more than one 
generation actively involved within the business. This definition is based on the two 
criteria of ownership and management presented, for instance, by Graves and Thomas 
(2008), and on the factor of continuity (see for instance Zahra, 2003). All the case firms 
were from the manufacturing sector and had fewer than 250 employees at the time of 
entry to the French market. Thus, they fulfilled the criteria of the Finnish government 
and the EU for classification as SMEs (OECD, 2003).  
          Multiple sources of information were used to gather data from each case firm. The 
main form of data collection was a semi-structured interview, guided by a list of topics. 
The interviews were conducted by one of the authors, a researcher who was fluent in 
English and French, and who had experience of living in French-speaking countries. The 
interviewer followed the guidelines set out by Huber and Power (1985) to minimize the 
risk of providing inaccurate or biased data. Altogether, eleven semi-structured open-
ended interviews lasting 60–100 minutes were conducted with two or three respondents 
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from each firm2, in the firm’s headquarters in Finland and in its subsidiary/agency in 
France. The interviewees selected had in-depth knowledge of internationalization and 
operations in France. Having two or three interviewees from each case firm we aimed to 
get the most relevant knowledge, and to counteract the biases of individual opinions 
(Huber and Power, 1985).  
Following Svendsen (2006), at the start of the interview, neutral and non-
threatening questions were asked to establish a relationship of mutual trust. The 
interviewees were first asked to describe their business in general, thereafter their 
operations related to internationalization as a whole, and from that the business 
connected to internationalization in France in particular. Once the main issues of the 
interview had been touched on, short questions, such as “Could you describe this? How? 
Why?” were posed to go deeper into the issue. Social capital in the process of entry to 
the French market was discussed through the following issues: (i) important events, 
persons, firms, or organizations that influenced the entry process, (ii) the development 
of relationships after the initial entry, and (iii) considerations relating to how and why 
the relationships developed in such a way. All these questions were developed 
according to the guidelines issued by Yin (1994), with the aim of making the questions 
as non-leading as possible.  
          All the interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. A second 
listening was conducted to ensure correspondence between the recorded and the 
transcribed data. The complete case reports were sent back to the interviewees and any 
                                                 
2 Two from the small firm B (employing fewer than 50 persons), and three from middle-sized firms A, C, and D.  
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inaccuracies they noticed were corrected. In addition, e-mail communication was used 
to collect further information and to clarify any inconsistent issues. To improve the 
validity of the study we collected and analyzed many types of secondary information 
(such as websites and annual reports). By comparing the interview data with other 
documents from the case firms, we carried out triangulation on the information (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).           
In the data-ordering phase, a detailed case history of each firm was formed, based 
on interviews and written documents. Pettigrew (1990) suggests that organizing 
incoherent aspects within a chronology is an important step in understanding the causal 
links between events. In our data analysis phase, cross-case pattern searching was 
utilized. The unique patterns of each case were identified and similar patterns were 
categorized under broad themes, on the basis of the research questions in the study. In 
addition, checklists and event listings were used to identify critical factors (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) related to determinants that might involve social capital.  
          To make the theoretical constructs of structural holes and network closure suitable 
for this study we have modified them to make them suitable for the international 
operations context. To illustrate the role of structural holes and the extent to which the 
case firms have bridges spanning these holes, the number of bridges is regarded as high 
or low. The number of bridges in the network of a firm is regarded as low if the firm has 
no contacts in the target market, and if in foreign operations it does not have any 
contacts other than foreign agents/subsidiary staff. The number of bridges in the 
network of a firm is regarded as high if the firm has several contacts in the target market 
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when planning foreign operations, or many contacts in addition to the ones it does 
business with. The level of network closure is regarded as:  
(i) Strong if the relationship with the foreign cooperator(s) is close, based on 
trust, mutual respect, open communication, commitment, similar values, a 
passion for the field, and freedom to act according to one’s own 
personality and creativity.  
(ii) Medium if there are only two or three of the following features in the 
relationship with the foreign cooperator(s): closeness, trust, mutual respect, 
open communication, commitment, freedom to act according to one’s own 
personality and creativity.  
(iii) Weak if the relationship with the foreign cooperator(s) has most of the 
following features: distance, a lack of trust, a lack of mutual respect, a lack 
of open communication, a lack of freedom, and a lack of commitment. 
 
5. Findings 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the most important social capital ties of the case firms in the French 
market and the strength and development of these ties. Firstly, we shall very briefly 
discuss each firm and its network development in the French market. Secondly, we shall 
discuss in detail the development of the firm’s social capital in the context of its 
international operations, making use of the structural holes and network closure 
perspectives. 
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Figure 1. Development of social capital within the case firms (upper right quadrant = 
Firm A, lower right = Firm B, upper left = Firm C, lower left = Firm D). 
 
5.1 The firms’ network development 
 
The stories behind the firms are important in order to situate the phenomenon under 
study, i.e. the development of social capital, in particular contexts. The following 
paragraphs will briefly present these stories. Firm A, which provides office equipment 
and manufactured products made of sheet metal, was established in 1876. In 1970, Firm 
A started exporting to the Nordic countries. In 1980, exporting was expanded to 
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Germany, and in 1982 export to France was launched. The agent that took care of the 
exports was found at an international exhibition, when Firm A was looking for suitable 
partners to increase its international sales. The relationship with the agent developed 
quickly and led to the establishment of a subsidiary in France, in 1984. Since then, 
cooperation in the French market has been problematic for Firm A, since it has been 
forced to change the subsidiary manager three times. 
          In the case of Firm B, which manufactures log houses, internationalization started 
in 1994, 21 years after the establishment of the firm (1973), with the export of log houses 
to Germany and Japan. The French trade started in 1998 in the form of exporting. The 
entry to the French market was based on the initiative of a French person who saw 
potential in selling the villas abroad. The relationship between the entrepreneur and the 
French agent very soon became strong. It was intended that a network of distributors 
would be formed, but the attempts to find reliable people in the French market failed. 
Hence, a representative office was established in France in 2002 with a view to 
facilitating administration. 
          The story of Firm C, currently run by the second generation, began in 1972. This 
firm manufactures different kinds of packaging materials. Poland was its first export 
market (1985). The firm exported to ten European countries and had a subsidiary in 
Poland before it entered France in 1989. Originally, four agents were found at 
international exhibitions; the relationship with them was something between strong and 
weak until two agents were replaced by better ones, also found at international 
exhibitions. Firm C wanted to strengthen its presence in Central Europe and looked for 
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suitable production opportunities in France through two intermediary organizations, 
Invest in France and Finpro. A suitable partner was found through Invest in France, and 
a joint venture involving a production plant was established in 2006.  
Firm D was launched in 1988 by an experienced entrepreneur. This firm produces 
various products including pipettes and analyzing systems. It is important to note that 
before the entrepreneur set up Firm D, he had run two similar kinds of businesses in the 
same field; his social capital from previous businesses was so strong that the 
establishment of the first foreign subsidiaries happened almost by itself. The French 
subsidiary was the first subsidiary to be established, in 1991.  
 
5.2 Structural holes 
 
In Firms A, B, and C, there was no existing social capital for entry into the French 
market. Hence, these family SMEs had a low number of bridges and their French foreign 
market entry was based on the formation of new social capital. Firm D is the only one 
that was able to utilize its existing social capital for the French entry: a previous business 
partner and friend resigned from his job and launched a subsidiary, three years after the 
owner-manager established Firm D. This subsidiary manager had also managed the 
preceding French subsidiary of the owner-manager. 
          As regards research question 1 (concerning the spanning of structural holes in 
post-entry international operations), Firms A and D have sought to develop new bridges 
only to a very limited extent, while Firm B looked for French bridges only right after the 
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initial foreign market entry. Firm C has been the most active and successful in 
developing post-entry bridges and the only one with a high number of bridges in the 
French market. Firm C has renewed two of its agents by attending international 
exhibitions, cooperated with intermediary organizations, and established a production 
joint venture in France. The joint venture partner was found through an agency (called 
Invest in France) which gave them a great deal of help. 
          As regards Firm B, after the initial FME, the entrepreneur and the French agent of 
Firm B drove together around France, searching for local retailers for their log houses 
(the prospective retailers are marked as C, standing for “candidate” in Figure 1). 
However, all the candidates contacted were found unsuitable, and Firm B went on to set 
up a representative office instead of a retailer network. Since then, bridges have been 
built to a more limited extent. Firms A and D have been inactive in developing bridges 
in the French market. Firm A has on three occasions been in a situation where they have 
needed to replace the existing subsidiary manager. However, since Firm A’s habit has 
been to search for new cooperators only when there is a true need for it, they have 
operated on opportunistic lines, recruiting from among their existing staff. As far as 
Firm D is concerned, the existing, trustworthy network tie in the French market has 
been found so reliable that the firm has not looked for any other cooperators there, 
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5.3 Network closure 
 
Generally speaking, all the case firms seem to have regarded the development of 
network closure as very important in their international operations, investing time on 
finding trustworthy partners and also on maintaining established relationships. As 
Figure 1 illustrates, most companies have succeeded in finding one trustworthy French 
partner with strong network closure (marked with a thick, black arrow), but many of the 
case firms have nevertheless had to cooperate with partners with medium network 
closure (marked with a gray arrow). Furthermore, most firms have network ties that 
belong to the category weak network closure. In some cases (see Firms A and C especially), 
a formerly medium network tie became a weak one and has, as a result, terminated. This 
illustrates the dynamics of network closure, in which problematic partnerships are 
ended and new ones established. These are important features in terms of research 
question 2 concerning network closure in the context of international operations. In the 
following sub-sections, the focus will be on (i) strong/strengthening, (ii) medium, and (iii) 
weak/weakening network closure among the case firms. 
          Strong/strengthening network closure. In Firm D, there was extremely strong network 
closure between the owner-manager and the French subsidiary manager. Both the 
owner-manager and the subsidiary manager emphasized respect, total trust, similar 
values, and a passion for the field as the secret of their extremely strong relationship, 
which had never had setbacks. The subsidiary manager expressed it thus: 
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What makes our relationship unique is respect for each other and inspiration regarding our field. 
We seem to see the world in the same way, we share values. He does not think about money so 
much, all the other aspects come first. And he also gives total freedom to me. I feel so comfortable 
with being able to run the French subsidiary my way. He always trusts me: if I want to do 
something, he says, yes, do that, you know what is best for you there. 
 
Firm C’s joint venture partner was described in fairly similar terms, with the 
resemblances between the two firms being emphasized. Like Firm C, the joint venture 
partner was 100% family-owned, and hence also a firm with family values, and the sizes 
of the two firms were fairly similar. The commitment of the French joint venture partner 
was crucial in the development of a good relationship, and their network closure 
became strong very soon after the two parties realized that they had common interests. 
In terms of the strong network closure perspective, Firm B, too, displays strong network 
closure between the owner-manager and the French agent. The French agent even took 
out a large personal loan to carry out his ideas for selling the log houses.  
          In Firms B and C, the finding of strong partnerships was based both on serendipity 
and on active search. However, Firm D was different; since the network closure between 
the French subsidiary manager and the owner-manager of Firm D was already strong 
before the launch of the French subsidiary. Furthermore, this relationship has been the 
most stable one. Although the present subsidiary manager had had a profitable 
subsidiary to run and although he was offered double the wages he was getting, he 
decided to start a new subsidiary for Firm D from scratch. All this illustrates how 
significant strong social capital ties can be when an international business is launched. 
Instead of having to concentrate on the initiation of network ties (as in the cases of Firm 
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B and C), the co-operators were able to concentrate on subsequent closure. The 
subsidiary manager explained his decision in the following manner: 
They offered me a five-year agreement and they offered to double my salary from the company 
where I was working. I said “No, I’m leaving. I have decided I’m leaving.” In Firm D, I like it 
that you have a certain way of doing business, meaning that there is business, but there is private 
life as well. With the Finnish companies, the human relationship is very important as well. And 
it is very important for me, too. And that is the main reason why I am still working with him. 
 
The French subsidiary has achieved very good results and has grown substantially. The 
subsidiary manager has given the same freedom to the subsidiary employees that was 
given to him by the Firm D manager, and he sees this as the secret of their success: 
I believe in people and letting them do things. So that they can create things in a positive way. If 
you don’t let people express themselves you won’t get as much as they can give. In order to be 
competitive, you need to have a team which is happy to work for the firm.  
 
Medium network closure. Relating to research question 2 concerning the development of 
network closure in international operations, we present below features connected to a 
medium level of network closure. Closeness and commitment remain essential features in 
such a level of network closure. Firm A’s subsidiary sales assistant described the 
relationship as follows: 
 
I would say they (the Finns in the headquarters) are very nice people, no problems with that. It’s 
a kind of family. We have relations with colleagues that have been so long in the company. And 
we know all the people in the company and the management. Really, I would not like to leave, 
because I feel at home here.  
 
In the case of Firm B, similar kinds of values were mentioned by the informants as 
present from the beginning of their relationship: mutual trust, closeness and an interest 
in cooperation. But by contrast, trust and respect seem to be qualities that can be lacking 
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in a relationship with medium network closure. Firm’s A current subsidiary manager 
and the subsidiary sales assistant explained the lack of trust and mutual respect in the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship in the following terms: 
 
When for example we explain that we should get a lighter range, they do not consider this. They 
listen to what you say, it is an open discussion, but it does not mean that anything 
happens…That is why I cannot really trust them. They always have an answer to my questions, 
but it is not really a good one. For example when they came to us here in the French subsidiary 
for a couple of days, they weren’t discussing with us, just checking how we were working, and 
there’s also the fact that they are producing these items and then thinking how we should sell 
them. 
 
In Firm C, too, there have been various social capital ties with medium network closure. 
Over a period of fifteen years, two of these agents have been replaced by better ones, 
due to the weakening of network closure. The best ones have been able to continue 
cooperation.  
          Weak/weakening network closure. A third perspective on research question 2, 
concerning the development of network closure in the international operations of family 
SMEs, is gained by examining weak/weakening network closure and the features 
underlying it. From the point of view of the headquarters, a weaker than expected level 
of network closure could be related to too high a level of control and to irregular 
communication with the subsidiary. The international sales manager at the 
headquarters of Firm A said: 
 
It started very well, but there were problems, because they did not want to follow our rules. And 
now, since then, I have also understood that we left them alone too much. We also experienced 
some misbehavior, because they realized that we did not control them. It is so important for the 
French to have a feeling of togetherness, but we had things too much like “us here” and “you 
there”.  
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The point of interest here us that the weakening of the originally trustworthy 
relationship with the subsidiary managers was also connected to too strong a belief that 
things would go well in France without a high level of control. Interestingly, from the 
headquarters point of view, there was also a problem with learning to know how the 
subsidiary employees felt about their managers. The manager of international affairs in 
Firm A explained the lack of openness in the following way: 
 
In France, the managers seem to have a very strong position. First of all, the employees do not 
voice judgments on their bosses to outsiders. We had several occasions when we realized that 
something was wrong in the subsidiary, but we just did not get any comments on it. They just 
could not say straight out what they thought of their boss.  
 
For Firm B, the formation of network closure with French retailers was very hard. Since 
they knew no potential French cooperators, the entrepreneur and the French agent 
travelled around France and discussed the matter with interested parties. Dozens of 
candidates were commissioned and many more were met, but they all failed to sell the 
Finnish log houses. In fact, there was not even a medium level of network closure with 
the new candidates. The network closure remained at a low level, since none of the 
potential retailers did what they promised. The entrepreneur explained their search for 
candidates as follows: 
 
We started by searching for local partners. They told us about the needs of the customers, we 
made the offers and they passed them on to customers. We played with these potential partners 
for many years, but none of them turned out to be trustworthy or able to sell. They just took our 
time and money. On one of the trips we went to Paris and met a man who ordered 30 log houses. 
And none of them were actually delivered. He just cheated us.  
 
23 
 
This had in fact caused some financial loss to Firm B. With four years’ experience of 
searching for suitable partners in France, Firm B ended up establishing a representative 
office in Paris, in 2002.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
In terms of structural holes, our material demonstrated that family entrepreneurs had a 
large number of structural holes in their foreign markets, especially when launching 
international operations, but also after several years of running international operations. 
Instead of trying to span structural holes, they concentrated merely on developing the 
network closure with agents and subsidiary staff. This led the family entrepreneurs to 
serendipitous procurement in their international operations: their international 
networks were limited, and they only started searching for new cooperators when there 
was a true need for it, at which point they behaved opportunistically. The need for a 
new network tie usually emerged after a network tie was proved weak. Since family 
entrepreneurs did not generally have ready-made partnerships in the target market, 
they went and looked for them at international exhibitions, or else they took on the 
search purely by themselves. The generally emerging pattern was that instead of 
seeking to span structural holes internationally, the family SMEs in this study 
concentrated on the development of network closure with a very small number of 
partners in their international operations. This large number of structural holes, in turn, 
led to serendipitous procurement in internationalization. 
24 
 
          Altogether, as regards research question 2 on the development of network closure, 
all the case firms spent a lot of resources on finding suitable network ties and on 
developing good network closure with the selected social capital ties. Yet despite the 
efforts, network closure between the headquarters and the subsidiaries/agents was 
often somewhat limited. Network closure was strong when the headquarters and the 
subsidiary/joint venture/representative office staff had a relationship based on respect, 
total trust, similar values, open communication, commitment, passion for the field, and 
freedom to act according to one’s own personality and creativity. The medium type of 
network closure was based on closeness and commitment, but trust and respect were 
generally lacking. As regards weak/weakening network closure, in the case of 
headquarters-subsidiary cooperation the problems were related to poor knowledge-
sharing and the possibilities of influencing how the firm was run. In Firm A, 
entrepreneurial freedom was either given too early (to their first subsidiary managers, 
who reportedly misused it) or not at all (to their last subsidiary manager, who felt 
frustrated). This would suggest that headquarters staff ought to be able to give 
entrepreneurial freedom at a particular phase – not too early, but soon enough. In the 
case of headquarters-agents cooperation, the problems were more related to not 
knowing and trusting each other sufficiently.  
If the overall picture is one of the strengthening of network closure being related 
to family SMEs agents’ and subsidiaries’ feelings of closeness and commitment, a 
weakening of network closure was related to negative feelings on the part of family 
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SMEs’ agents and subsidiaries concerning trust (the lack of it), mutual respect, open 
communication, and freedom to act according to one’s own personality and creativity. 
As regards the research question 3 of how network closure and structural holes 
explain the development of international operations in the French market, the 
predominant feature in our material – in line with the observations of Gargiulo and 
Benassi (2000) –  was one of a lack of simultaneous maximization of the two network 
mechanisms; the firms tended rather to concentrate on network closure. Firm C came 
closest in our material to providing a counter-example: the firm here seemed to be 
seeking to embark on a strengthening phase in both network mechanisms, at least in 
turn, but partly also simultaneously – and indeed, the firm would merit longer-term 
follow-up with a focus on this aspect. Nevertheless, the evidence at present seems rather 
to suggest that a general concentration on increasing network closure runs counter to the long-
term survival of family SMEs in the target market; once a problem with the partner appears, 
there are no networks to replace that partnership. As Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) 
suggested, the establishment of strong ties is important in the formation of inter-
organizational ties, but in a later phase, the flexibility offered by structural holes may be 
more important than network closure. Moreover, as argued by Podolny and Baron 
(1997), by focusing on network closure family entrepreneurs lose timely information on 
new opportunities.  
          Overall, it seems that in family SMEs there is a tendency to construct a single 
trustworthy social capital tie, instead of efforts to create additional social capital ties. We 
cannot at this point state that such a process is inevitable, but we did observe that due to 
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concentration on just a few social capital ties, firms were obliged to go (for instance) to 
exhibitions to look for new cooperators. Although they had indirect bridges to French 
cooperators through their trustworthy French partners, these could be lost with the loss 
of the foreign partner. Family entrepreneurs may, naturally, form some strong 
connections through their partner’s connections (Burt, 2010); however, there is a strong 
possibility that if problems arise, these secondary connections will follow the strong tie 
they know, leaving the family entrepreneurs without any international network ties in 
the specific market in question.  
          Altogether, in our material it appeared that the entrepreneurs gained support and 
resources from their cohesive networks, but that the obligations hindered their ability to pursue 
new opportunities. As regards social capital, the greatest threat to the family SMEs 
seemed to be related to the dependency on one foreign cooperator and, hence, to a lack 
of the social capital obtainable by spanning structural holes. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This study contributes to research on social capital and internationalization of SMEs in a 
number of ways: (1) It investigates the development of social capital in the international 
operations of family SMEs – hence responding to calls for more research on network 
development in the entrepreneurial process (Jack, 2010), especially in the context of 
internationalization (Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010). (2) We contribute to research on 
social capital by applying the notions of network closure and structural holes to the firm 
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internationalization context, and by extending a theory on them in the context of family 
SMEs’ international operations. (3) The study contributes to family business research by 
revealing how these mechanisms restrict and facilitate family SMEs’ international 
operations, bearing in mind that despite the suitability of family SMEs for research on 
social capital (Salvato and Melin, 2008),  it has been unclear how social capital affects 
their internationalization and foreign operations (Kontinen and Ojala, 2010).  
In terms of managerial implications, this research has a number of 
recommendations to offer. Family entrepreneurs seem to have a tendency to concentrate 
on a limited number of foreign partners, and to neglect the building of new 
relationships that could help them in future challenges. They should acknowledge the 
need to develop new partners in international exhibitions, through customers, and so on. 
Family entrepreneurs should also take care not to select their cooperators very 
arbitrarily – and not trust unknown people too soon. However, once the cooperation has 
begun and trust has arisen, firm managers ought to give freedom to their subsidiary 
managers, gradually, allowing them do business with an entrepreneurial mindset. 
Excessive control is harmful for cooperation or for a good level of trust. Furthermore, 
firms should avoid showing distrust towards their subsidiary staff simply because of 
earlier, harmful events caused by previous managers. 
Managers should look for help in networking: the person looking for suitable 
cooperators ought to know both the culture and the business field. Family businesses do 
not want to invest money on finding good relationships, but in the end they can lose 
money by not doing so, since they may end up having to deal with opportunistic or 
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exploitative behavior. Family business managers could also be bolder in developing 
new network ties, even if they have found good existing ones. If cooperation ends for 
one reason or another, it is often too late to find a good partner to replace the one who 
was lost. Furthermore, family managers may have a tendency to hire new managers 
from among the existing staff. However, it may well be better for them to look for 
alternative network ties from outside the subsidiary. 
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